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Abstract 
Market-based approaches to environmental management, such as payment for 
environmental services (PES), have attracted unprecedented attention during the past 
decade. PES policies, in particular, have emerged to realign private and social benefits such 
as internalizing ecological externalities and diversifying sources of conservation funding as 
well as making conservation an attractive land-use paradigm. In this paper, we review 
several case studies from Asia on payment for environmental services to understand how 
landowners decide to participate in PES schemes. The analysis demonstrates the 
significance of four major elements facilitating the adoption and implementation of PES 
schemes: property rights and tenure security, transaction costs, household and community 
characteristics, communications, and the availability of PES-related information. PES 
schemes should target win-win options through intervention in these areas, aimed at 
maintaining the provision of ecological services and improving the conditions for local 
inhabitants. 
 
JEL Classification: Q57 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
During the mid-1980s, the concept of integrated conservation and development gained 
momentum in many countries in Asia and southern Africa with the goal of conserving 
biodiversity and supporting rural livelihood. This approach combined social development 
goals and biodiversity conservation, with an assumption that local livelihood practices are 
important threats to the biodiversity and that diversifying local livelihood options will reduce 
human pressures on biodiversity, leading to improved conservation (Hughes and Flintan 
2001). However, many integrated conservation and development projects (ICDPs) failed in 
achieving the ecosystem conservation goals as these projects were unable to understand 
the complexity of socio-ecological systems, especially the interdependency that exists 
between the resources and people living around them. Although ICDPs were envisaged to 
be the best option for conserving biodiversity, they suffer from conceptual flaws that limit 
their appropriateness, especially in reconciling an increasing human demand and inherently 
unstable wildlife populations (Barrett and Arcese 1995). Many ICDPs could not take into 
account external factors such as a growing market demand for forest and biodiversity 
products, demographic pressures, and local social and economic realities. Illegal activities 
such as logging, mineral extraction, and ranching further aggravated the failure of ICDPs, 
which were often overlooked while designing these initiatives. One serious criticism of ICDPs 
is that the poorest and most marginal households have hardly benefited from these 
approaches. Further, most ICDPs were collapsed immediately after the technical and 
business support services disappeared once the initiative ended. Many researchers later 
questioned the viability of ICDPs, especially linking it with local communities and resource 
management initiatives across diverse geographic conditions and economic situations 
(Barrett and Arcese 1998; Gunatilake 1998).  
More innovative forms of conservation strategies have gradually emerged in the past decade 
in response to the failure of ICDPs. These new strategies intend to provide direct economic 
incentives for land stewards for environmental services such as forest management, 
watershed protection, and biodiversity conservation. The concept has attracted 
unprecedented attention because natural and human-managed ecosystems produce 
environmental externalities (a situation where certain actions of producers or consumers 
have unintended external [indirect] effects on other producers and/or consumers) and that 
internalizing these externalities through incentive-based mechanisms will encourage 
individuals to take into account the effects of their actions on others, which could lead to an 
efficient outcome. Among these instruments, market-based approaches to environmental 
management such as payments for environmental services (PES) gained popularity both in 
developed and developing countries for maintaining and ensuring the provision of ecological 
services and improving the conditions of local inhabitants. The concept of PES represents a 
new and more direct conservation paradigm in which producers of environmental services 
receive direct compensation from beneficiaries of the ecosystem services for the benefits 
they receive from the producers (Landell-Mills and Porras 2002). Wunder (2005: 24) defines 
PES as “a voluntary transaction where a well-defined environmental service (ES) (or a land-
use likely to serve that service is being “bought” by a (minimum one) environmental service 
buyer from a ES provider and the ES buyer does so if and only if the ES provider over time 
secures the conditional provision of that service.” PES is rooted in the theory that direct 
economic incentives for landowners are more effective than indirect means of financing and 
command-and-control regulation for better land stewardship (Ferraro and Kiss 2002) and 
that the incentives help internalize the ecological externalities associated with the use of 
ecosystem services. PES usually covers four types of environmental services: watershed 
protection, biodiversity conservation, landscape beauty, and carbon sequestration.  
Landowners manage forests and vegetative cover to generate a variety of environmental 
services, but they usually do not receive any compensation for such crucial services. As a 
consequence, forest conservation and watershed management makes little sense to 
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landowners as they receive fewer benefits from such land uses compared to other practices 
(i.e., conversion of forestland to cropland or pastures). As a result, upstream landowners 
impose costs on downstream resource users in terms of decreased supply of water, 
sedimentation, and reduced fish catch or diminishing supply of other biodiversity-related 
goods and services. This can lead to socially sub-optimal land-use decisions. In such 
situations, payments by ecosystem service users to producers help to make conservation 
efforts more attractive (Engel and Palmer 2008). Payments also make land-use options with 
conservation more attractive to local land users or ecosystem managers. They may be better 
off because of the greater local benefits of the forest conservation option than that of land 
conversion. Downstream populations are also better off as payments to land users are less 
than costs that would actually be required to pay if upstream landowners opted for 
conversion of forest land to cropland or pastures. The payment must be more than the 
additional benefit to land users of the alternative land use and less than the value of the 
benefit to downstream populations (Pagiola and Platais 2002). It should be noted that 
potential payments under a PES scheme for the continued or increased supply of 
environmental services includes not only direct cash payments. Payments can be comprised 
of more innovative options such as the recognition of indigenous rights to local resources 
and tenure security, wages for services rendered, health and education infrastructure for 
local inhabitants, improved delivery of services such as education, skill training, and 
mechanisms for reducing vulnerability of poorer households through enhancing social safety 
nets, among others. 
While advances in market-based instruments for environmental services help access diverse 
sources of funding and make conservation a more competitive land use (Asquith, Vargas, 
and Wunder 2008), very few empirical studies examine the factors influencing landowner 
decisions to participate (with the exception of Pagiola, Landell-Mills, and Bishop 2002; 
Zbinden and Lee 2005; Huberman and Leippraud 2006). Moreover, not much research has 
been done towards defining the necessary conditions of the successful design and adoption 
of environmental service markets so that the environmental conservation and development 
objectives can be achieved simultaneously (Grieg-Gran, Porras, and Wunder 2005). While 
several recent studies provide some useful insights on PES mechanisms (FAO/REDLACH 
2004; Huang and Upadhaya 2007; Leimona and Lee 2008), there is a need to scrutinize 
these claims more rigorously by collating and analyzing the available body of knowledge in 
this area.  
Researchers have put forward a number of factors influencing landowner decisions to 
participate in PES schemes such as household and community characteristics (Zbinden and 
Lee 2005), enabling national and international conditions (Leimona and Lee 2008), political 
willingness on the part of national and local governments to develop policies in support of 
environmental service markets (Huang and Upadhaya 2007), and land use and service 
supply (FAO/REDLACH 2004). Yet, it remains unclear how and to what extent factors such 
as property rights and tenure security, transaction costs, and household and community 
characteristics influence the adoption of PES schemes by landowners, which are described 
as being crucial elements in the PES literature (Grieg-Grann and Bann 2003; Swallow, 
Meinzen-Dick, and van Noordwijk 2005; Pagiola, Artcenas, and Platais 2005). To date, little 
research has successfully addressed the knowledge gaps with regard to the adoption 
potential of environmental services markets in Asia.  
This study relies on a review of eight existing case studies of ongoing PES initiatives in Asia. 
PES is a relatively new concept and has only recently begun to gain ground in most of the 
countries considered in this study. We therefore tried to select cases which fulfill the criteria 
required for a full-fledged PES as closely as possible or those that contain basic 
fundamentals of PES and have applied basic market-based instruments in developing 
reward mechanisms for environmental services provision. The PES case studies we will 
review here are largely exploratory and descriptive and allow us to examine the issues 
discussed earlier. In the following section, we will present a synthesis of the findings of the 
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case studies. The third section will analyze and discuss the findings from these case studies. 
The fourth section will provide the major conclusions. 
2. REVIEW OF CASE STUDIES FROM ASIA 
In this section, we will review eight case studies from Asia of watershed services, 
biodiversity conservation, carbon sequestration, and initiatives on establishing markets for 
landscape beauty. Since most of these schemes are at an early stage of operation, we will 
summarize important findings in these studies that may have more general implications for 
the success of environmental service markets in the region. 
2.1 Payment for Environmental Services in Viet Nam: Assessing an 
Economic Approach to Sustainable Forest Management  
(The and Ngoc 2006) 
This study provided a review of sustainable forest management in Viet Nam, which aimed at 
assessing constraints and opportunities for adopting PES schemes in the forestry sector. A 
field-based experiment was undertaken in a cluster of three selected upland communities 
(Khe Tre, Huong Phu, and Xuan Loc) in the Thua Thien Hue province of central Viet Nam for 
a period of 26 months. Data collection methods included stakeholder workshops, interviews 
with relevant governmental and non-governmental organizations, and collection of socio-
economic data using semi-structured interview techniques. An econometric analysis 
approach assessed the determinants of adoption of PES schemes. 
Since the late-1990s, the Vietnamese government has pursued decentralized policies 
towards environment and natural resource management, including the forestry sector. The 
legislation offers a favorable environment for supporting community-based approaches to 
forest management as well as PES schemes in the country. Although formal ownership of 
land rests with the government, households, individuals, and organizations are allocated 
land for long-term productive uses such as agriculture, forestry, and aquaculture. Three 
types of forests are considered for benefit-sharing arrangements with individuals and 
organizations: special, protection, and production forests. In Viet Nam, communities have 
very limited rights to enter into such contracts. Special forests are allocated to households 
and individuals who plant, regenerate, and protect the forest. It is possible for them to 
undertake ecotourism-related initiatives in these forests. In return, they are entitled to receive 
payments from the state. In protection forests, individuals and organizations can harvest dry 
and diseased trees and non-timber forest products. For the non-forested land allocated for 
conservation and protection purposes, they receive payments from the government for all 
conservation-related interventions. Timber harvesting through selection techniques is 
acceptable in the protected forests along with the use of non-forest areas for agricultural 
purposes (not more than 20% of allocated land). In cases where private investments have 
been made, households are entitled to receive 100% of the benefits when such forests reach 
the harvesting stage. 
Compared with special and protection forests, production forests provide the most benefits 
to communities. In them, individuals and organizations can collect forest products such as 
dead trees, trees damaged by natural calamities, timber for house construction, and residual 
products of silvicultural operations for subsistence purposes. Further, forest products from 
production forests can be harvested according to the condition and state of the forest. For 
instance, communities are entitled to obtain 100% of the subsistence forest products from 
those forests that were poorly regenerated during the time of the handover, 70–80% from 
regenerated forests, and 2% of the annual products from the forests where the annual 
growth rate is over 100 meters³ (m)/hectare (ha). It is possible to harvest 95% of the 
products from bamboo forests. Cattle grazing is also permitted in production forests. 
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Households are entitled to obtain about 75% of the forest products from plantation forests 
established by the state and later handed over to individual (or community) management. 
Agroforestry and inter-planting activities are also permitted; households can enjoy 2% of the 
annual harvest against adoption of such land-use practices. 
This case study analyzed the relationship between household characteristics and the 
decisions of upland farmers to participate in different PES schemes, particularly the adoption 
of different forest management practices. It appears that the availability of family labor was 
positively associated with the adoption of PES schemes. Education of the head of household 
was found to be another important factor that significantly influenced a household’s decision 
to participate in PES schemes. The size of the resource was another consideration as the 
area of forest plantation was positively associated with the adoption of PES schemes. 
Another interesting finding of this study was the role of debt in participating households. 
Probability of adoption was negatively correlated with the amount of outstanding loans. 
Moreover, it was demonstrated that debt stress may force households to harvest plantation 
forests early. This is because income from environmental service payments would not be 
sufficient to mitigate the loan burden. This indicates that the long-term sustainability of these 
forests depends on the loan repayment ability of farmers. Characteristics of the resources 
themselves were positively associated with PES adoption. For instance, plantations that are 
easily accessible with high growth potentials are likely to be considered for PES schemes by 
the villagers. Farmer’s adoption of PES schemes in Viet Nam was, therefore, found to be a 
function of the area of forests, human capital, and household economic situation, particularly 
education and the availability of family labor. 
The study also examined potential constraints for adopting PES schemes. Lack of private 
ownership was identified as a major barrier for participation in PES schemes in Viet Nam. 
One important finding in this connection appears to be the type of rights people could 
practice in these three different forest management regimes. Farmers could decide the type 
of tree species to be planted in the case of production forests. However, this was not the 
case with special and protection forests where government policy dictated the choice of 
species, timing of harvests, and harvesting methods. PES schemes seem to be easily 
adoptable in production forests where forest owners have some leverage on land use. 
However, environmental services provided by protection and rehabilitation activities in 
natural forests are often valued highly compare to that of production forests. Further, 
services generated by production forests seem to be of limited concern to policy makers. 
Perhaps this is one of the constraints for PES in Viet Nam where environmental services 
outside protected areas have been mostly ignored. 
Transaction costs for forest-based PES schemes were another concern. The total annual 
transaction cost per contract in the study sites was about US$35 which is a significant 
amount for poor smallholders. Further, transaction costs per hectare of forest enrolled in the 
PES scheme were US$20 (about D570,000). This amount is actually two times higher than 
the payments they receive for a hectare of forest under the PES scheme. The fragmentation 
of plantation forests owned by households (usually two ha/household scattered in many 
different places) means high transaction costs for negotiations, monitoring, and enforcement 
of PES-related contracts. 
2.2 Institutional Constraints and Opportunities in Developing 
Environmental Service Market: Lessons from Institutional 
Studies in Indonesia (Arifin 2005) 
This study examined institutional constraints and opportunities for markets for environmental 
services with a review of three cases of watershed, biodiversity, and carbon sequestration 
services in three different provinces (Sumber Jaya, West Lampung; Bungo, Jambi; and 
Singkarak, West Sumatra) of Indonesia. 
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The Sumber Jaya sub-district is a hilly area suitable for growing coffee which had been the 
major land use in the upper watershed. Although people had been practicing coffee-based 
agroforestry for decades, thousands of people were evicted during the Suharto 
administration as a policy of protecting the sub-watershed. The government’s plan for 
building a hydropower plant in the early-1990s further marginalized the local people, 
culminating in a forced removal of large numbers of people from the watershed. After the fall 
of the Suharto regime in 1998, a number of conflicts emerged between the government and 
local coffee growers around the land-tenure issue. The degradation of the watershed 
continued due to coffee monocultures, environmentally unfriendly horticulture practices, and 
cultivation of secondary food crops without proper conservation measures. The shortage of 
water was a particular problem to a government-owned hydroelectricity plant which is 
supposed to generate 144 megawatts (mW) of electricity along with providing drinking water 
for the surrounding areas. In the late-1990s, the government later adopted a regional 
autonomy approach with some authorities devolving to local government that included taxing 
and levying power on coffee and non-timber forest products. The central government’s 
decree of community-based forest management also recognized the rights of local people to 
coffee-based agroforestry and access to other forest products. As some scientific studies 
have suggested the coffee multi-strata system was as effective as other environmentally 
friendly land-use options, the local coffee growers were granted temporary five-year tenures 
in 2001. After five years, the tenure was reviewed and was able to be extended for another 
25 years, allowing local people to use state-managed protected forests. 
The Bungo occupies an area of 455,208 ha of the Batang Hari watershed of high biodiversity 
value. Main land uses in the watershed include forest (37%), monoculture rubber plantation 
(31%), rubber agroforestry (13%), oil palm (13%), young palm (5%), and other categories. 
Smallholders maintain rubber plantations and take part in rubber agroforestry under different 
institutional arrangements between the landlords and share-trappers. In order to increase 
production, the Smallholder Rubber Development Project assisted local people with clonal 
high yielding variety of rubber which yield an average of 990 kilograms (kg) dry rubber per 
hectares compared to 640 kg of relatively low yield variety. Rubber agroforestry (referred to 
locally as “jungle rubber”) is a viable option for maintaining biodiversity services in humid 
tropics. The product of the jungle agroforestry system in the area (latex) provides 70% of 
local household income. However, jungle rubber agroforestry is under stress due to pressure 
for either high-value food crops or rubber monoculture with high yielding varieties. The area 
is also under pressure for other development interventions such as mining and oil palm 
investors are keen to expand plantations in upland areas. 
The catchment of Lake Singkarak covers 129,000 ha. Land uses include rice paddies (21%), 
upland crops (17%), and other uses (30%). Lake Singkarak provides water to a hydropower 
plant with a 175 mW capacity. However, production in the catchment has declined 
significantly in recent years due to deforestation and land degradation. Poverty in the 
Singkarak catchment has become a serious problem. Approximately 77% of the catchment 
population depends on agriculture and fishery activities and 10% of them are practicing 
shifting cultivation. In 2004, the catchment was selected for forest-carbon projects by the 
Ministry of Environment. The project is expected to contribute to poverty reduction and 
environmental conservation through afforestation and reforestation activities. It also provides 
direct economic incentives to local people through the carbon sequestration service they 
offer through watershed conservation. 
These three cases provided a number of lessons, particularly regarding the role of 
institutions for the adoption of PES schemes and development of reward mechanisms. The 
strength of collective action was key in securing temporary tenure rights and reducing the 
transaction costs of forest management in Sumber Jaya. In this area, five farmer 
organizations were recognized by the government under its community-based forest 
management program. They were crucial in adopting conservation values in local land-use 
decisions. Further, the temporary written rules on “tenure” provided an adequate basis for 
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protecting water resources for downstream users. The recognition of rights to organize by 
the government also helped build trust and a sense of guardianship among villagers. The 
role of bonding and bridging social capital provided a foundation for the adoption and 
implementation of the PES scheme in Sumber Jaya. 
Institutions supporting biodiversity services in Bungo were achieved by acquiring land-use 
rights through forest frontier activities such as initial planting of cash crops. Major cash crops 
planted for claiming rights were rubber, cinnamon, and other tree crops. The local 
community has rights to enforce certain rules such as declaring the land common property in 
which agricultural activities have been absent for more than 10 years. In Bungo, there is also 
congruence between locally crafted rules and the state’s rules with regard to forest 
conservation. They enforce tanah batin (a locally devised land-use norm) that governs lands 
assigned for upland paddies where a number of ritual activities could be performed. Local 
institutions were instrumental in Singkarak for providing carbon sequestration services. The 
revival of the nagari system (a very complex social system of governing land use in the area) 
contributed significantly to environmental conservation. The notion of common property is 
widely held in West Sumatra, which governs land use, fishing, and forests uses. The negari 
system acknowledges self-ownership of resources. 
In all the cases, the existing institutions were instrumental in reducing transaction costs, 
particularly encouraging collective action towards forest and watershed conservation. In 
Sumber Jaya, the gotong-royong (labor sharing for common property) and arisan (capital 
sharing on regular basis) systems provided much required social capital for facilitating 
markets for environmental services in the area. It was also true for Bungo where pelerin 
(labor sharing for private land) and berselang (labor sharing for paddy planting and 
harvesting) systems were instrumental in uniting local communities for marketing carbon 
sequestration services. Cooperative actions mediated by these institutions helped develop 
criteria and indicators required for equitable and fair payment systems that would have been 
expensive without the recognition of traditional management institutions. 
This review also shed light on the role of intermediary organizations which facilitated the 
adoption of sustainable land-use practices in the area. Further, building the capacity of local 
government in forestry and watershed management appeared as another factor which 
promotes the implementation of PES schemes. 
Conversely, this review found that transaction costs (currently US$55/household with annual 
farm income of US$1,035 [i.e., 6%] in Sumber Jaya) of the PES schemes are still high and 
that could be an obstacle for the sustainability of the PES schemes in the long run. 
2.3 Environmental Services “Payments”: Experiences, 
Constraints, and Potential in the Philippines  
(Arocena-Francisco 2003) 
This study reviewed four ongoing PES schemes in the Philippines with varying management 
interventions, development assistance, and institutional arrangements. Watersheds included 
in this study were: Makling Forest Reserve (MFR) managed by the University of the 
Philippines, the Maasin watershed managed by the local government unit with multiple 
funding sources, Northern Sierra Madre Natural Park (NSMNP) managed by a non-
governmental organization (NGO) with funding from the European Union and the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID), and Mount Kanlaon Natural Park 
controlled by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources with funding from 
Global Environment Facility. In terms of land area, the sites range in size from the 4,244 ha 
MFR to the 359,486 ha NSMNP. While the Maasin watershed covers an area of 6,738 ha, 
Mount Kanlaon National Park occupies 24,557 ha and is one of the ten priority sites covered 
by the Conservation Priority Protected Areas Project in the Philippines. 
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These areas experienced severe deforestation and watershed degradation in the early-
1990s. Inadequate water supply during the dry season was a major problem in the MFR. 
Encroachment of adjoining land posed a serious challenge for watershed conservation. 
About 64% of the Maasin watershed is under cultivation resulting in severe degradation of 
forests. At present only 35% of household water requirements are fulfilled by the watershed 
and dry season irrigation is a major hurdle for local people not only due to inadequate supply 
of water, but also quality and intermittent faucet flow. Widespread logging and shifting 
cultivation practices pose a threat to the NSMNP watershed in which the forest area shrunk 
by 25% from its 1950s level by the 1990s. Livelihoods of 5,000 households in this watershed 
are under stress due to reduced supply of forest products, agriculture inputs, and fishing. 
Mount Kanlaon National Park is a very diverse park in terms of the biodiversity it supports, 
but there is already huge pressure on its resources. Both indigenous and migrant people 
occupied a big portion of the land resulting in accelerated degradation of the watershed. 
Since the early-1990s, PES schemes were supported in these areas to reverse the situation. 
Reforestation and tree-planting activities were supported in the MFR along with the adoption 
of agroforestry systems. Local people were provided with tenure security through some local 
arrangements, paid labor, scholarships for high school students, cash incentives, and 
training activities on sustainable land-use practices. People participated in watershed 
rehabilitation projects in the Maasin watershed through a variety of conservation initiatives 
such as reforestation, assisted natural regeneration, timber stand improvement, and rattan 
and bamboo enhancement, among others. A number of national and international 
organizations provided funding for PES schemes in this area including the Asian 
Development Bank, the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, the National Economic and 
Development Authority, and the national and district governments. In the NSMNP, a number 
of conservation efforts have been initiated through Plan International with funding support 
from the Dutch government. Some of these initiatives include community-based forest 
management, forestland regeneration, nursery establishment, resource inventory, training 
activities, and other interventions targeted at supporting local livelihood. Security of land 
tenure was among a few incentives provided to local farmers in the area. Park management 
activities vested on the Protected Area Management Board in the Mount Kanlaon National 
Park. Local people are now receiving funding for non-destructive livelihood projects. 
Communities in the watershed are expecting secure tenure rights through the community-
based forest management agreement which is awaiting approval from the Department of 
Environment and Natural Resources. 
This review captured quite a few operational issues associated with participation in and 
adoption of PES schemes. A few notable issues were: the role of government support, 
communication, and information; the presence of local NGOs; and local contextual factors. 
As discussed in the theoretical framework, political willingness and support from the local 
government was a success factor. This was confirmed by the case of the Maasin watershed 
where the local provincial governor and municipal mayor were champions of PES, motivating 
local stakeholders and mobilizing finance for conservation activities. The case of NSMNP 
was similar as local government contributed to the PES activities, another successful 
rewarding mechanism in the area. Further, continuous support from the local government 
was instrumental when charging a watershed protection fee as in the case of MFR. 
Information exchange and communication between different stakeholders appeared to be 
critical for creating a support base for PES as substantiated by the case of the MKNP and 
Maasin watersheds. In the Maasin watershed, about 70 information centers serve different 
actors by providing information on watershed management and also support for 
environmental movements in the area. The Watershed Management Council in MKNP is 
serving the same purpose through facilitating the adoption of a watershed management 
strategy. Efforts towards educating people, better communication, and exchange of 
information were key in the successful implementation of PES schemes in the Kanlaon area. 
ADBI Working Paper 134  Adhikari 
 
8 
The role of intermediary organizations was apparent in many cases, especially in raising 
awareness among stakeholders. Their actions in organizing and mobilizing communities, 
collecting data, garnering volunteering support, conflict resolution, and executing local 
activities of environmental interest were a notable mention in Maasin. Support from outside 
agencies (mainly funding agencies) was another stimulus for PES. However, the Maasin 
case also offers some cautions for uncoordinated efforts in financing PES schemes. It is 
recommended that less emphasis be given to external funding for local PES schemes and 
more to increasing local awareness through education, communication, and information 
exchange based on purely locally driven initiatives, which are likely to have more positive 
impact on the sustainability of PES schemes. 
Spatial coverage of PES schemes was another condition that emerged from this case study. 
It appears that targeting the entire watershed yields more positive results than considering 
only the upland communities. Wunder (2008) also discussed the possibility that strategic 
spatial targeting could have larger biodiversity, landscape beauty, and watershed protection 
benefits. These services are often very space specific. Further, reaching the offsite 
beneficiary is important as they stand to benefit the most from environmental services 
provisioning. However, a larger watershed implies more resources for protection. Watershed 
protection activities (including the use of resource pricing) were at a very advanced stage in 
the two relatively small watersheds (Maasin and MFR) compared to the larger watershed of 
NSMNP. Institution building is another obstacle in larger watersheds where communities are 
heterogeneous in terms of socio-economic characteristics. 
The case study also highlighted the importance of a number of contextual factors. First, the 
location of the watershed (proximity between where services are generated and the area 
where these services are consumed) appears to be a “push factor” for creating demand for 
environmental services. This is exemplified by the case of the Maasin watershed where the 
forest watershed is in close proximity to the city. Due to this proximity, any negative changes 
in the provision of watershed services (especially quality and quantity of drinking water 
supply) could be immediately felt by the local population. Second, the case demonstrated 
the impact of different levels of community preparedness for undertaking PES schemes. For 
example, communities that already have social infrastructure in place, such as mature 
community organizations, are more likely to succeed in implementing PES schemes than 
communities without them. 
2.4 Compensating Upland Communities for Watershed Services in 
the Kulekhani Watershed, Nepal (Upadhaya 2005) 
The Kulekhani watershed, distributed over 12,492 ha and encompassing portions of eight 
village development committees (VDCs), is located in the Makwanpur district of Nepal. 
About 45,000 people live in the upper catchment area of the watershed. They collect a 
variety of forest products including fuel wood, fodder, and other non-timber forest products 
from the forested watershed for subsistence purposes. It provides water to two hydroelectric 
plants, constructed in 1982 and 1985, respectively, which generate a total of 92 mW of 
electricity. The power station is operated and managed by the Nepal Electricity Authority 
(NEA), a public sector utility company that owns most of the power plants in the country. 
However, soon after it began operation, it was noticed that the watershed was a source of 
sediment influx into the Kulekhani reservoir along with water for hydroelectricity generation. 
According to a study (Amatya 2004), the soil erosion rate for agricultural land in the 
Kulekhani watershed was substantially higher (73 metric tons/ hectare/ year) than that of 
forest land (1 metric ton/ hectare/ year). The total storage capacity of the reservoir had been 
reduced by 23 million m³ by 2002. 
In the early-1980s, the government initiated watershed conservation efforts with financial 
assistance from USAID, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), 
and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The main objective of the project 
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was to reduce the rate of sedimentation to increase the lifespan of the reservoir and improve 
land-use practices aimed at supporting rural livelihoods. Major project activities included 
community forestry, conservation education, terrace improvement, and fruit plantation in 
marginal lands. These conservation efforts resulted in reduced siltation and increased dry 
season water flow. The study was able to establish a link between land use and the 
sedimentation rate. Studies show that a total of 243,311 m3 of additional water was made 
available because of forest conservation in the upstream watershed. 
The NEA requires a portion of revenue generated from hydropower plants to be paid to the 
central government. As envisaged in the Local Self-Governance Act of 1999, the central 
government allocates 12% of the royalty to the local government through the Makwanpur 
District Development Committee (DDC). According to 2006 DDC guidelines, 50% of this 
revenue must be spent in the upstream-downstream of the Kulekhani watershed where 
electricity is generated. Subsequently, the government made it mandatory that another 38% 
of the royalty be distributed among all districts that house hydropower plants. 
The conservation efforts of the communities in the upper watershed proved to be crucial in 
lowering sedimentation and increasing the amount of water available for electricity 
generation, especially during the dry season. Winrock Nepal, under the Rewarding Upland 
Poor for Environmental Services (RUPES) program, facilitated the set up and operation of a 
reward mechanism for sharing hydropower revenues with upland communities, as well as 
motivating them to practice environmentally friendly land-use options. The program 
facilitated the formation of the Kulekhani Watershed Conservation and Development Forum 
(WCDF), a local organization comprising environmental service providers within the 
Kulekhani watershed. The program recently proposed that the DDC should earmark 20% of 
the hydropower revenue received by the district government for conservation of the 
upstream watershed. This fund would be managed by a committee comprised of local 
environmental service providers and downstream environmental service beneficiaries. 
This case study provides a few insights that are crucial for the adoption and establishment of 
markets for environmental services. First, the enabling of environmental policy, particularly 
community-based policy aimed at natural resource management, was a key factor in the 
adoption of the PES scheme. Nepal is considered a leader in community forestry for its 
progressive laws and policies. Local communities were granted significant use and 
management rights over local forests through the Forest Act of 1993. The government’s 
emphasis on providing a sense of tenure security over forest resources has helped facilitate 
not only the community forestry initiative, but also a number of other conservation 
undertakings such as leasehold forestry, water, and wildlife management. Rights to forest 
resources provided a good context for negotiating and initiating the reward system in the 
watershed. Further, a number of other local governance regulations favor the idea of 
marketing watershed services. Notably, the Local Self-Governance Act and the Electricity 
Act support paying for the environmental services generated by watersheds. 
Second, the role of intermediary organizations was critical to convincing service providers 
and beneficiaries of the value of watershed services. These organizations have played a 
crucial role in capacity building in the local communities, raising awareness about 
environmental services, and providing policy support that is seldom offered, especially in 
environmental service market sectors. The presence of the RUPES program (an initiative of 
the World Agroforestry Center, which conducts targeted action research to examine and 
explore the environmental service markets in the region) was vital in facilitating the whole 
process through its research and advocacy work aimed at developing positive incentives for 
service providers. The review of this case study explicitly emphasized that the presence of 
credible local organizations, such as community forestry user groups, was instrumental in 
mobilizing local communities for the PES program. These organizations also triggered the 
establishment and functioning of the Watershed Conservation and Development Forum 
(WCDF), which has played a crucial role in mobilizing local communities towards 
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conservation initiatives and managing allocated revenues for watershed management and 
local empowerment activities. 
The Kulekhani is a smaller watershed, for which establishing links between upstream 
conservation efforts (e.g., afforestation, terrace improvement, and changes in land-use 
practices) and downstream water quantity and quality was relatively easy. The watershed 
service market was reinforced by a number of good case studies that established the direct 
connection between land degradation in the upper watershed and its downstream effects on 
the provisioning of watershed services. The ease of demonstrating the cause-and-effect 
relationship helped motivate both service providers and buyers to realize the importance of 
watershed management. The presence of a buyer for environmental services (i.e., the 
hydropower company) proved to be another important condition for marketing watershed 
services. 
The Kulekhani case study also highlighted a number of policy challenges to materializing the 
operation of an effective PES scheme. The first challenge was to enhance the capacity of 
stakeholders to institutionalize the reward transfer mechanism. Second, an appropriate use 
of received payments in conservation and development was crucial for the sustainability of 
the PES scheme. Finally, continuous support to local communities through social 
mobilization and institution building was another ingredient to encourage landowner 
participation in the scheme. The study indicated that political instability could divert the 
government’s priorities towards short-term projects and policies rather than PES schemes. 
Another challenge for PES is to make sure that payments for environmental services work 
for poor people and subsequently help reduce poverty in the area. 
2.5 Payment for Environmental Services: The Sloping Land 
Conservation Program in the Ningxia Autonomous Region of 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC)  
(Zhang, Tu, and Mol 2008) 
In 2002, the PRC government initiated the Sloping Land Conversion Program (SLCP) aimed 
at reducing soil erosion and increasing forest cover in the PRC. The program was initially 
piloted in 1999 to discourage agricultural activities in steep slopes and marginal lands in 
response to a severe drought in the Yellow River basin and the devastating floods in 
Yangtze River basin in 1998. With a budget of US$40 billion (CNY337 billion), the program is 
now being implemented in more than 2,000 counties across 25 provinces and municipalities. 
Approximately 15 million farmers are covered in this first “payment for environmental 
services” program in the PRC. The State Forestry Administration plans to convert around 
14.67 million ha of fragile cropland (with a slope greater than 25 degrees) to forests and 
grassland by the completion of the program in 2010, making it one of the PRC’s most 
ambitious environmental initiatives in recent decades. 
Although the initial focus of the program was on ecological restoration, the focus has shifted 
slightly towards off-farm income generation. In recent years, the program has come under 
scrutiny with regard to the rationality, adequacy of institutional design, and implementation 
modalities adopted by the program. Particularly, concerns have been raised about the 
relevance of such large-scale, campaign style, and top-down approaches to environmental 
conservation. 
Compensation for farmers in this program includes both kind and cash payment. 
Participating farmers must modify the existing parcels of lands either into forests or 
grasslands. Three major types of PES mechanisms were considered: ecological forests, 
economic forests, and grasslands. In the Yangtze River basin, each household receives an 
annual grain subsidy of 2,250 kg for a conversion of a hectare of existing agricultural land 
into one of these land uses, whereas this is set at 1,500 kg/ha in the Yellow River basin. 
These grain subsidies are decided on the basis of the average productivity of the land. 
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Currently, farmers can get a cash subsidy of CNY300/ha/year for eligible land uses. Both 
grain and cash subsidies are provided for up to eight years for ecological forests, five years 
for economics forests, and two years for maintaining grasslands in the watersheds. For 
those farmers who are willing to undertake afforestation activities, they receive subsidized 
seedling with a value of CNY750/ha. The underlying assumption of the program is that if 
farmers are provided with economic incentives, it could be possible for them to divert from 
traditional and destructive land-use practices towards environmentally friendly activities. This 
also helps reduce poverty by encouraging surplus agricultural forces to engage in other off-
farm activities. 
This paper reviewed the implementation of SLCP in the Ningxia autonomous region with 
particular focus on social capital for the sustainability of the SLCP program. The high rates of 
poverty, fragile and degraded ecosystems, and political and economic isolation are a few 
characteristics of this region. A survey was undertaken in three southern counties: Tongxing, 
Pengyang, and Xiji. A total of 316 households were interviewed to collect information on the 
socio-economic characteristics of households, livelihood activities, and perceptions and 
experiences in the SLCP program. In addition, information was collected with regard to 
perception about land security, decision-making power, and access to credit, capital, and 
market. 
This review indicated that SLCP-related PES activities are highly ecologically oriented. The 
program is putting less emphasis on socio-economic and institutional issues. Institutional 
factors such as land rental, tenure security, and inadequate focus on social capital 
development emerged as few constraints for the success of the program. Further, access to 
market and credit was important to mention. About 63% of respondents stated that they 
have to use personal networks based on family kinships to get information about markets, 
technologies, skills, and jobs. The adoption of PES schemes was slower due to the absence 
of a market as well as an absence of off-farm income opportunities for individuals and 
households. Although the role of off-farm activities was greatly emphasized in order to divert 
people from traditional agriculture practices, the study found that this strategy hardly 
addresses the problem as the average education level of households in the region is very 
low. 
Farmer organizations are considered a luxury in the Ningxia region compared to more 
developed regions of the PRC. Further, organization building and strengthening were not 
part of the program which is considered a rather new phenomenon in Ningxia. Even where 
they were present, these organizations were not strong enough to spread risk by pooling 
community resources in time of economic shock and hardships. It appears that only 8% of 
the respondents were members of a farmer organization. Although 70 % of laborers involved 
in the SLCP are women, there is no single self-initiated women’s association. Further, top-
down approaches to SLCP excluded farmers from participating in decision-making 
processes on many occasions. 
This study pointed out that the sustainability of SLCP in the region depends on enabling 
economic policy measures such as off-farm income opportunities, strengthening farmer 
organizations, and participatory decision-making processes. Further, the current level of 
compensation schemes is not adequate for the sustainability of the SCLP and these 
incentives should be strong enough to change farmer behavior towards more 
environmentally friendly land uses. Another fundamental problem for the sustainability of 
SCLP in the region is the lack of policies in social capital development. The SCLP was 
similar to other poverty alleviation programs in the government as a result of insufficient 
institutionalized participation of local farmers. The study concluded that the program will not 
succeed in the long run unless favorable policies for social capital development are put in 
place. 
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2.6 Payment for Environmental Services: Experiences and 
Lessons from Viet Nam (Hoang, van Noordwijk, and Thuy 2008) 
This study drew lessons from payment for environmental services by reviewing four PES 
case studies from Viet Nam. During the late-1990s, the Vietnamese government enacted a 
number of laws such as the Law on Water Resource (1998), Law on Land (2003), Law on 
Forest Protection and Development (2004), and Law on Environmental Protection (2005). 
These laws, to a certain extent, recognize environmental services provided by ecosystems 
such as biodiversity conservation, watershed protection, carbon sequestration, and 
landscape beauty. Later, a number of resolutions endorsed economic instruments for 
environmental management. Of particular interest are the Natural Resource and Water 
Resource Acts that specify taxes to be paid by users of ecosystem services. 
The first case was the PES scheme in the Tri An watershed, comprised of the Dong Nai and 
La Nga rivers in Dong Nai province. These rivers are sources of water for the Tri An 
hydropower plant. Further, the lower Dong Nai is a source of water for the three provinces of 
Hi Chi Minh City, Dong Nai, and Binh Duong. Increased pollution was a severe problem in 
the Doi Nai River due to the industrial and domestic wastewater, agricultural run-off, 
contamination from fish farms, and sedimentation in river beds from deforestation in the 
surrounding watersheds. This substantially increased the treatment costs for water utility 
companies. Water supply companies were interested in watershed protection activities in the 
upper watershed for maintaining the provisioning of clean and continued supply of water. A 
project funded by Danish International Development Assistance, the World Wide Fund for 
Nature (WWF), and other partners was aimed at addressing water pollution in the Tri An 
reservoir and the lower Dong Nai River. The group proposed the establishment of a payment 
scheme between water supply companies and the upstream groups who were polluting the 
river. Since finding the source of pollution and costs incurred to water companies is the first 
step towards establishing payment systems, a study of pollution and hydrology in the 
watershed is currently underway. Based on the findings of this study, a fund will be 
established in order to encourage local communities towards environmentally friendly land 
uses. A management board (consisting of representatives from relevant stakeholders) will 
oversee the potential payment systems with a provision of third-party monitoring. 
The second case study looked at a sustainable financing model for landscape beauty in 
Bash Ma National Park in central Viet Nam. The park covers 37,499 ha, of which 32,157 ha 
is upland forested area in the Perfume River watershed. In 2007, WWF Viet Nam and the 
Forest Protection Department of Hue undertook a study on the willingness of tourists who 
visited the national park to pay an entrance fee. The study recommended fees of D39,000 
for international and D34,000 for domestic visitors. The watershed has also been providing 
water to a regionally renowned water company operating in the region since 2005. Potential 
contributions from the water company for the park management were also considered. The 
study further identified other potential companies and downstream water users who 
benefited by watershed protection and who would be willing to pay for improved watershed 
services. Currently, an effort is directed towards establishing a conservation trust fund. This 
fund will be invested in biodiversity conservation and sustainable agriculture practices in the 
buffer zone of the park. 
In the Cao Phong district of the Hoa Binh province, a pilot carbon sequestration project is 
being jointly undertaken by the Department of Forestry, Japan International Cooperation 
Agency Vietnam Forestry University, and the Research Center for Forest Ecology and 
Environment. It has strong environmental protection and poverty reduction components 
through income generation from forest products and a carbon sequestration scheme. It is 
estimated that about 60,000 to 80,000 carbon credits could be obtained through the certified 
emission reductions (CERs) under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change within the next 20 years. The identified buyers were domestic paper companies and 
international carbon markets through the CERs. Honda Viet Nam provided financial support 
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for this project. The beneficiaries include 300 local households who will benefit from timber 
and sale of carbon credits from the protected forests. The protection activities include a 
plantation of 350 ha of acacia forests, an establishment of 30 ha of fodder crops for 
improving cattle grazing, biogas as an alternate fuel to firewood, and effective use of crop 
residues. The local government will have an important role in implementing the project 
activities. 
The final case study was of the Nha Trang Bay marine protected area (MPA) which contains 
important coral reefs, sea grass, and mangrove habitats. This 13,000 ha MPA hosts more 
than 350 species of corals and provides a number of benefits to local communities. The park 
is also crucial from the tourism point of view as 400,000 tourists visited the park in 2004 for 
sightseeing, snorkeling, and diving. From 2002–2005, a number of discussions were held 
with the private and public sectors about how agencies could generate adequate funding for 
the protection of the MPA. As a result, entrance fees were introduced for securing 
sustainable financing for the protected area. The project aimed to share 10–15% of the 
income generated from entrance fees with local communities for a number of development 
and environmental conservation activities. To date, a total of six villages have already 
received US$2,000 (for each village) to undertake specific development and environmental 
activities including development of waste management system, construction of a road, a trail 
path for school children, and establishment of a village learning center. These funds are 
managed by the Khanh Hoa People’s Committee (a committee established for developing 
formal mechanisms to allocate funds). Further, a total of US$115,000 was provided to the 
Nha Trang Bay MPA Authority for the management of the park. 
A number of lessons can be drawn from these PES initiatives in Viet Nam. First, the case of 
the Tri An watershed emphasized that any efforts to secure payments for watershed 
services should clearly demonstrate the costs and benefits of watershed protection to 
relevant stakeholders. PES schemes are likely to be successful if the benefits of watershed 
protection are clear, particularly to the buyers. In this regard, technical studies that identify 
links between upstream land uses and downstream water quality are of prime importance. 
Buyers of watershed services can only be persuaded after this connection has been 
established. Second, enabling government policies were instrumental in addition to voluntary 
involvements of buyers and sellers. The role of micro-credit is another factor for the adoption 
of PES schemes. The study highlighted that micro-credit initiatives are instrumental if 
farmers have to modify the current land uses for adopting the PES scheme. Finally, 
experience shows that formal contracts between buyers and sellers are important features 
for the successful implementation of PES schemes as demonstrated by the case of Tri An. 
The quality of environmental services appears to be fundamental as demonstrated in the 
case of Bach Ma National Park. For instance, improving tourist services was the first step 
towards attracting a large number of visitors that subsequently helped raise revenues to 
finance conservation and reward local people for the environmental services they provide. 
The carbon sequestration project of the Cao Phong district demonstrated that integration of 
the forest-based carbon sequestration objective into forestry development with voluntary 
payment mechanisms serves as an important recipe for a PES scheme for carbon 
sequestration. Clear and transparent benefit-sharing systems with a strong equity 
component appear to be another key ingredient for successful implementation. The 
importance of a clear mechanism for allocating funds appears to be important, as shown in 
the case study of the Nha Trang Bay marine protected area. Support from the government 
agencies in the area of capacity building and technical assistance were crucial for PES 
schemes to operate sustainably. The role of government support has been emphasized in all 
case studies, particularly for clear mechanisms that provide community-wide benefits, policy, 
and capacity-building assistance and enforcement of contracts in addition to voluntary 
contracts between buyers and sellers. 
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2.7 Market for Ecosystem Services in Australia: Practical Design 
and Case Studies  
(Whitten, Coggan, and Shelton [eds.] in press) 
This paper analyzed three different market-based instruments in Australia. While the first 
case study dealt with a rewarding mechanism for reducing salinization in the Wimmera 
region of southwest Australia; the second dealt with water quality, biodiversity, and amenities 
values in Muttindindi Shire in Victoria; and the third addressed the maintenance of native 
vegetation. Each case study focused on an important ecosystem service that addressed a 
number of environmental problems in the region. The Wimmera region is predominantly an 
agriculture-based economy. The main environmental problem in this region is the recharge 
of saline ground water aquifers causing soil salinization and increased in-stream salinity. The 
ecosystem service studied in the Whitten et al. paper was the management of salinity 
outcomes, particularly reducing recharge to saline aquifers through the establishment of 
deep-rooted and perennial vegetation. Potential sellers for salinity-reducing services were 
local landowners who owned land on steep hill slopes within the target region of the 
catchment. The Wimmera Catchment Management Authority (WCMA) was the buyer. 
Land fragmentation (especially for hobby farming and rural residencies) is a serious issue in 
Murrindindi. This has an adverse impact on many ecosystem services in the region. Market-
based approaches for establishing native vegetation were a major issue for the third case 
study. This is of particular importance as there is no clear cut understanding between the 
use of provenance-specific seed and important ecosystem services. Institutional, industrial, 
and biophysical constraints are considered to be the root cause of failure of native seed 
markets in Australia. 
A number of factors emerged from these cases studies, particularly the importance of market 
failure, information asymmetry, and scientific uncertainty while establishing markets for 
environmental services. For instance, this review showed that rights to salt and water 
movement in landscapes are not clearly defined. Compared to steep hills with perennial 
vegetation, hills with sparse vegetation and limited deep-rooted perennial vegetation have 
greater potential to contribute to deep drainage and, therefore, to the movement of salt in 
landscapes. As a result, downstream landowners expect salinity neutral land-use practices 
in the upper watershed. Upstream farmers, however, do not have any incentive to meet 
those expectations as a result of property rights failure (e.g., rights to salt movement). At 
present, there is no mechanism for rewarding a particular action directed to reduce ground 
water discharge because of the no-rivalry or non-competitive properties of this service in the 
sense that all downstream users benefit from the reduction, but no one is forced to pay for 
maintaining the provision of service in question. This is the most important feature of market 
failure in ground water management and also, the largest potential driver of policy 
intervention in the region. Information asymmetry was another constraint. Landowners were 
not aware of the specific contributions that different changes to the land management could 
generate different recharge outcomes and reduce the movement of salt. Scientific 
uncertainties such as knowledge about recharge quantity, ground water dynamics, and salt 
sources and concentrations were among a few other difficulties in identifying the potential 
outcomes. Transactions costs of monitoring and difficulty in measuring the success appears 
to be an obstacle for adopting market-based approaches to ecosystem services. For 
instance, one challenge for the project was to identify the best possible recharge outcomes 
through the modification of current use practices. Improvement in current land uses, 
however, requires considerable upfront investment which is beyond the capacity of many 
local landowners. Further, benefits from these investments could only be realized over the 
long term, which further complicates landholder decisions to invest. The cost of monitoring 
was the major concern for the success of the reward mechanism as compliance to different 
land-use decisions was not easy to measure. 
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The study recommended a number of measures to address property rights failure, the 
problem of information asymmetry, and scientific uncertainties associated with the market-
based approach to ecosystem services. First, negotiations around “who is to pay whom” 
could be possible only after establishing well-defined property rights over the service in 
question. Second, the contributions of specific land use to reduce salinization need to be 
assessed at the best downstream location. Defining the boundaries of those eligible would 
be an alternative means of identifying location impacts in the provisioning of services 
(establishing the connection between service providers and users). Additionality was another 
factor, especially measuring how changes in ecosystem services compare to the “business 
as usual” scenario. Finally, the presence of a service purchaser (in this case WCMA) was an 
important condition to address the issue of non-excludability (or the problem of public good) 
in ecosystem service markets. Some additional elements such as decision-making 
processes, transparency, and negotiation of contracts were identified as additional 
ingredients for the successful implementation of PES schemes. 
The remaining two case studies further stressed the establishment of property rights 
because of the strong non-excludable property of the services under consideration. Further, 
mechanisms to address the problem of asymmetric information were discussed. The study 
suggested that competitive tender mechanisms especially designed to create incentives for 
landholders by revealing the costs incurred by them due to changes in land use could help 
eliminate the problem of cost-related asymmetric information. Similarly, revealing the costs 
of reclaiming salt-intruded land to downstream landowners could help to solicit the support 
required for implementing a reward mechanism. The case study provides three major 
conclusions. First, there should be an established link between land management practices 
in upper watersheds and changes in downstream ecological outcomes. By doing so, it could 
be possible to create a market for ecosystem services in which ecosystem users could be 
willing to pay for an increased supply of these services. Second, tender and contract 
processes must be robust with the adequate participation of concerned stakeholders. Finally, 
appropriate mechanisms should be in place to make sure that management changes are 
successfully implemented to achieve desired outcomes. On the whole, the paper argued that 
market failure associated with ecosystem services needs to be overcome by designing an 
effective and efficient rewarding mechanism for land-use practices. Market-based 
approaches to ecosystems are not only about creating markets for all services, but careful 
selection and design of an appropriate instrument with the objective of fulfilling the needs of 
participants. 
2.8 Developing Markets for Watershed Services and Improved 
Livelihoods: Fair Deals for Watershed Services in India 
(Agrawal et al. 2007) 
This case study drew together lessons from three watershed management projects (Kuhan 
and Suan of Himanchal Predesh and Bhoj in Madhya Pradesh) that aimed to adopt 
incentive-based mechanisms to watershed protection and rural livelihoods improvement in 
India. 
The Changar region of Himanchal Pradesh is a water-scarce area where springs used for 
drinking water often run dry in the summer. Local people rely on a lift-based drinking water 
supply (a Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit [GTZ]-funded project has been 
under operation since the early-1990s) during the dry season. The project covers 37 micro-
watersheds with a focus on watershed management and livelihood enhancement. Two 
catchments of interest are Kuhan and Suan in Himanchal Pradash. The Kuhan catchment 
covers about 210 ha where agriculture is the mainstay of the local economy. The major 
problem in this catchment was the high silt load which resulted in silting up in the reservoir 
which provides water to the nearby lift irrigation system. Another catchment, Suan, covering 
an area of 406 ha, experiences a similar water scarcity problem. Forest fires, declining water 
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quality and quantity, and drying up natural springs encouraged the local political unit (the 
Village Development Committee) to think about installing a lift irrigation system. Though this 
did not materialize due to some local level conflicts, the focus later shifted towards upstream 
land management through fire control, erosion control measures, and grassland 
conservation. 
The Bhoj wetlands of Madhya Pradesh cover an area of 361 kilometers2 (km) and a water 
spread of 31 km2. A smaller lake was created in 1794 and receives water from the upper 
lake. The Bhoj watersheds are an important source of drinking water and recreation for the 
residents of Bhopal City. Currently, the upper lake provides about 40% of the city’s drinking 
water requirements. A large number of local people depend on the wetlands for fishing, non-
timber forest products, and recreation. However, the wetlands are facing twin problems of 
poor water quality and reduction in storage capacity due to siltation. Major sources of 
pollution are an inflow of sewage and solid waste from the urban areas and runoff from 
nearby agriculture fields. 
Incentive-based mechanisms to watershed protection were tested through an action-learning 
approach in these three watersheds. In Kuhan, the objective was to strengthen local 
institutions and increase downstream coverage of irrigation in order to have a large 
constituency of beneficiaries and generate funds for the catchment protection. The second 
objective was to motivate villagers for ecologically sensitive land-use practices in the upper 
catchment. A geo-hydrological assessment of the watershed helped to identify erosion-prone 
zones and areas where immediate conservation measures were required. Villagers helped 
the project by closing a small patch of land close to the stream and also agreed to plant 
trees for restoring the degraded area. In return, they were provided with tree saplings and 
technical assistance to implement the watershed conservation program. A number of other 
conservation measures were put in place such as construction of check dams to combat soil 
erosion. 
Maintaining and enhancing summer flows of the stream was the chief objective in the Suan 
micro-catchment for the planned irrigation scheme. Despite the initial interest of villagers, 
this irrigation project was not realized due to a conflict in the lower village, limited impact of 
land-use changes in the provisioning of watershed services as indicated in the geo-
hydrological assessment, and lack of initial success in securing government funds for the 
project. Further, there was an issue of initial investment for fencing the cropped area to 
reduce crop damage by wild animals. In the Bhoj catchment, a change in agricultural 
practices in upstream farms was the major concern. Some proposed activities included 
switching from chemical to ecologically-friendly agriculture, erosion control, and 
improvement of lake water quality. Further, raising awareness for both upstream and 
downstream stakeholders was a key component. Payments from watershed protection 
beneficiaries to service providers have been attempted at all three sites, but payments have 
been taking place only in Kuhan. Of the remaining two watersheds, payments may take 
place soon in Bhoj, but this has not yet materialized in Suan. 
A number of methodological lessons emerged for an incentive-based approach to watershed 
protection in these sites in India. It was found that projects that build on the existing 
partnerships are likely to come into operation sooner and also be successful over the project 
cycle. Community mobilization at the initial stage of the projects is crucial for motivating 
stakeholders towards collective action. PES-related initiatives usually do not have provisions 
for heavy investment in physical infrastructures. It required, therefore, a greater effort to 
motivate communities to participate in the scheme. An element of capacity building and 
training turns out to be crucial where new concepts and techniques are being tested. 
Capacity building in downstream institutions is very important for changing perceptions about 
paying for watershed services. Effective communication and exchange of information play an 
important role in building and maintaining support for PES-related schemes as the concept 
of watershed services is still new to the local communities. 
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As in the case of other community development projects, broader participation of different 
sections of the society was a stimulus for implementing market-based approaches to 
watershed services. For instance, there were intense consultations with woman-headed 
households in Kuhan that led to an agreement. However, this process was not visible and 
inadequate in Suan where upstream stakeholders were not willing to shift grazing from the 
catchment and this resulted in the collapse of negotiations in the Bhodi catchment of the 
Suan watershed. Transparency in the transaction process is very important for the voluntary 
market for environmental services. In Kuhan, the selection of a new VDC executive body 
promoted transparency and also boosted confidence in the VDC functioning. A shorter 
planning horizon is not conducive to watershed service markets because any payment 
agreements should allow time required for effective land-use change. 
Another lesson was congruence between the spatial scale of the biophysical processes and 
administrative areas. For instance, the catchment was under the Panchayat administrative 
boundary in Kuhan. The overlap of catchments with the administrative boundary made it 
possible for buyers and sellers to reach an agreement. This was not the case in Bhoj, where 
users and suppliers of watershed services are represented by different administrative 
bodies. This review also stressed the match between the temporal scale of the biophysical 
process and the decision-making process. In Kuhan, a time frame for the agreement was 
adequate for changing certain activities, such as stopping grazing in the catchment. In Bhoj, 
however, the negotiated time frame for switching from high external input agriculture to 
organic methods was not realistic. Instead, a long-term agreement for reducing pollution and 
increasing the quantity of water in the lake would have been a more effective solution. 
Local available technology could be more acceptable to landowners when it comes to 
changing land-use practices. This kind of local solution also creates a win-win situation and 
helps provide direct benefits for the upstream community and watershed service benefits for 
downstream users. For example, a bamboo plantation in Kuhan resulted in grass yields 
while maintaining grass cover during the monsoon. Further, locally mobilized resources 
(both cash and kind) and legitimate reasons for farmers to participate were more effective 
than motivation from external funding. People highly valued cash payments generated 
locally over payments by NGO or government institutions. 
Credible scientific information that links watershed services to land-use practices is 
important for watershed services agreements. Convincing hydrological information helps 
assess problems, areas of intervention, and builds consensus among stakeholders to make 
payments and change land use. However, this seems to be a significant challenge for all 
PES-related schemes. Another lesson from this case study was the role of local institutions 
for reducing transaction costs. In Kuhan, functional local institutions that represent both 
buyers and sellers helped to reach agreements and reduce transaction costs. However, this 
was not the case in Bhopal where the lack of credible local institutions at the upper 
watershed together with multiple downstream beneficiaries increased the costs of 
transaction. 
Another interesting condition for the PES negotiation that emerged from this study was 
addressing the multiplicity of ecosystem services in cases where there is no single dominant 
financial benefit from watershed service markets. The Bhoj case suggests that 
demonstrating multiple use and non-use values of the lake (e.g., water quality, recreation, 
bird habitat, and fish catch) to both upstream landowners and downstream users expedited 
the payment agreement. As in other case studies, the role of local champions (e.g., local 
politicians or local NGOs) was critical for driving the process forward. Exchange visits and 
field trips to successful sites help to increase understanding and motivation among 
stakeholders. Finally, the study concluded that market-based approaches to watershed 
services would likely be sustainable where the PES processes addressed the needs of 
various stakeholders upstream. 
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3. DISCUSSION: SOME INSIGHTS FOR DESIGNING PES 
Evidence from the case studies reviewed here suggests a number of factors that have 
implications for the adoption of PES, and the impact this may have on livelihoods, as well as 
the ultimate effectiveness of the mechanism in protecting ecosystem services. The findings 
of this review could be organized into four broad categories: property rights and tenure 
security, community characteristics and the role of collective action, transaction costs, and 
the role that information and communication in PES schemes play in the likelihood of them 
being adopted by local landowners. In the following section we will elaborate these findings 
under these four headings. Although it is still too early to fully evaluate these PES schemes 
as they are at an early stage of implementation and lessons are still more suggestive than 
conclusive, we hope lessons from this review will offer some fundamentals for the next 
generation of PES schemes to becoming a success. 
3.1 Institutional Arrangements 
Secure property rights arrangements have been considered prerequisite in the PES 
literature (Grieg-Grann and Bann 2003). Most ecosystem services are public goods because 
of the difficulty of excluding anyone from enjoying these services and also the inability of 
management institutions to limit the benefits to only those who bear the cost of maintaining 
these services. This non-excludability and non-rivalry in consumption means there can be 
failure in the markets and free riding. As PES schemes usually require a significant upfront 
investment for land-use modifications or improvements, insecure land tenure could 
discourage farmers from making long-term investment decisions. This is particularly true for 
poor squatter communities in rural areas where usufruct rights held by the communities are 
vulnerable to development interventions. Past experience shows that countries that manage 
to clarify and strengthen land tenure are most likely to succeed in implementing PES 
schemes (Leimona and Lee 2008). The case studies support these prepositions and suggest 
that launching large-scale PES schemes cannot be sustainable without addressing land 
tenure issues, an urgent necessity for generalizing conservation contracts (Karsenty 2008). 
Importance of tenure security, from identifying service suppliers to determining beneficiaries 
and encouraging farmers to invest in land conservation decisions, strongly emerged as a 
stimulus for the environmental service markets. For instance, even with the temporary 
written rules (a sense of tenure security), communities in the Sumber Jaya province of 
Indonesia were willing to maintain watershed service provisions for downstream users. 
Further, the recognition of informal institutions such as rights of a local community to declare 
the village land where agricultural activities have been absent for more than ten years as 
common property facilitates the adoption of the PES scheme. Bungo’s case shows 
congruence between locally crafted rules and the state’s rules, an important factor that helps 
promote institutional efficacy with regard to forest conservation. A number of locally 
practiced land-use norms such as tanah batin (lands assigned for upland paddies where a 
number of ritual activities could be performed) and nagari (a complex social system 
governing land use) were instrumental in Singkarak for executing a carbon sequestration 
project. The notion of common property approaches to land is widely held in West Sumatra 
which governs land use, fishing, and forests uses. These traditional institutions acknowledge 
self-ownership of land by both the state and societal rules which, to some extent, facilitate 
the PES scheme in the area. The importance of tenure security also came up strongly in the 
case study of the Kulekhani watershed in Nepal. It demonstrates that the implementation of 
the PES scheme was possible due to the policy of community-based forestry adopted by the 
government through the enactment of the Forest Act in 1993. In contrast, the lack of private 
ownership of land was identified as a factor responsible for the relatively lesser degree of 
success in adopting a PES scheme in Viet Nam. 
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A large body of literature recognizes informal institutions as a key determinant in 
understanding rural development outcomes (Scoones 1998; Mehta et al. 1999). This notion 
appears to be consistent with the outcomes of PES schemes in Indonesia. For example, in 
Sumber Jaya, two informal institutions, gotong-royong (labor sharing on common property) 
and arisan (capital sharing among community members), were instrumental in facilitating the 
adoption of local PES schemes. This was also the case in Bungo where pelerin (labor 
sharing for private land) and berselang (labor sharing for paddy planting and harvesting) 
systems were instrumental in uniting local communities for the carbon sequestration project. 
These informal institutions help increase local participation and adoption of conservation 
measures as well as reduce the costs of transactions. This review of the case studies 
confirms that social relationships and networks are critical to uniting communities, and that 
these institutions promote cooperation, share resources and risks, and facilitate the adoption 
of PES schemes. 
In some cases, PES schemes help strengthen land rights (e.g., temporary rights established 
through frontier activities) where tenure security is very informal. For example, in the Bungo 
watershed in Indonesia, institutions supporting biodiversity services were achieved through 
acquiring land-use rights by forest frontier activities. This includes the planting of cash crops 
such as rubber, cinnamon, and other tree crops. Plantation of these cash crops facilitates 
the adoption of PES schemes, which in turn, provide a sufficient basis for farmers to claim 
permanent land rights in areas where PES schemes are functional. 
Enabling policy environment appeared to be crucial for both tenure security and mobilizing 
resources for PES schemes. The case studies show that major support for PES usually 
come from dynamic and innovative leaders at both local and national levels who can act as 
champions for innovative approaches. For example, political willingness and support from 
the local government was a success factor in the Maasin watershed in the Philippines where 
the provincial governor and municipal mayor were champions of PES, motivating local 
stakeholders and mobilizing finance for conservation efforts. Further, in the NSMNP 
watershed in the Philippines local government contributed to the PES scheme directly. This 
support was not only crucial to consolidate local efforts towards PES, but also instrumental 
in designing acceptable watershed protection fees to be paid by watershed service 
beneficiaries in the area. Even though government entities would not assume the role of 
suppliers and buyers of all environmental services, participation in PES could be enhanced 
through enabling policy support, and financial and technical assistance. The role of national 
governments will be more relevant when it comes to creating the necessary legal framework 
for PES schemes, and if sufficient governmental institutions are present, property rights can 
be clearly assigned and enforced (Huberman and Leippraud 2006). Equally important is 
cooperation between other relevant institutions towards the shared objectives of enhancing 
environmental service markets and conservation. Since partnerships between private and 
civil society institutions are relatively uncommon (Agrawal 2008), a more coordinated and 
integrated approach helps efforts toward addressing poverty-related environmental 
degradation and comprehensive natural resource management. 
Equity has to be addressed especially in the adoption of a proactive approach in areas such 
as distribution of entitlements, designing payment schemes, and crafting institutions for 
resource use by reflecting the welfare of those directly affected by the scheme. The Viet 
Nam case study accentuates the importance of transparency and equity in benefit sharing. 
The case study of the Nha Trang Bay marine protected area unequivocally pointed out the 
importance of clear mechanisms for allocating funds to legitimate stakeholders. Researchers 
have emphasized the importance of accurate information, fair institutional mechanisms, and 
appropriate incentives for watershed service markets (Asquith, Vargas, and Wunder 2008). 
The success of the PES scheme also depends on how property rights are assigned. The 
issue of property rights could be determinant in ensuring equitable participation, potentially 
excluding landowners who do not hold proper land titles (Huberman and Leippraud 2006). 
For instance, implementation of PES schemes could alter the existing system of resource 
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use as enjoyed by poorer households under the informal and customary institutional 
arrangements. Any alteration of resource use due to the definition or redefinition of existing 
property rights could have negative consequences on local livelihoods. For example, an 
alteration could cause concern to the landless, who do not have formal rights to land despite 
their cultural and spiritual dependency on ecological services. In such a situation, resistance 
to PES could emerge if these informal rights are not considered. Evaluating the social 
impacts of PES schemes is thus important for understanding the possible social 
consequences of PES schemes on different stakeholders or policy changes with regard to 
resource management. India’s experience shows that formalization of property rights 
through a market-based mechanism for watershed services may hurt the poor where rights 
to ground water are ill-defined (Kerr 2002). 
3.2 Transaction Costs 
Consistent with theory, this review posits that high transaction costs could be a barrier for 
participation because they create disincentives for market exchange. Transaction costs in 
PES schemes refer to those costs associated with negotiation and enforcement of the 
scheme. Negotiation costs include time and effort in organizing buyers and sellers, 
assessment of current land uses and land-use practices, establishing and designing 
contracts, and preparing documentations as well as the costs of making implementation 
decisions. The transaction costs of monitoring include costs of certification, monitoring of 
contractual obligations of buyers and sellers, and among groups of buyers and sellers 
(Swallow, Meinzen-Dick, and van Noordwijk 2005; Adhikari and Lovett 2006). Higher 
transaction costs involved in PES schemes have implications on cost-efficiency, 
effectiveness, and equity involved in developing PES schemes as well as sustainability in 
the long run (Mayrand and Paquin 2004). Findings from this study confirmed the earlier 
arguments that high transaction costs (e.g., of information, of defining property rights, and of 
drawing up legal contracts) could create barriers for small holder’s participation in 
environmental service markets (Asia-Pacific Forestry Commission 2006). 
The role of intermediary organizations appeared to be vital to link service producers and 
buyers as well as reducing the costs of transaction. Past evidence shows that awareness of 
environmental services and even willingness to pay for environmental services rose through 
the concerted efforts of environmental NGOs (Leimona and Lee 2008). These organizations 
can mobilize and assist communities in crafting rules and regulations at the local level. The 
role of NGOs was apparent in many cases, especially in raising awareness among 
stakeholders. In the Maasin watershed in the Philippines, NGOs helped in community 
mobilization, organization build up, data collection, conflict resolution, and execution of 
environmental activities compatible with the PES scheme in the watershed. In the Kulekhani 
watershed in Nepal, the presence of credible civil society organizations, such as community 
forestry user groups, boosted the adoption of PES schemes through community 
mobilization, advocacy, and raising awareness. Institutional access was relatively easy in 
this area because of the presence of mature community-based organizations. Local 
intermediary organizations could facilitate negotiation and coordinate activities to help 
reduce the costs of negotiation, monitoring, and implementation. 
3.3 Household Characteristics and the Role of Collective Action 
The case studies highlighted a number of socio-economic factors that have important policy 
implications for the adoption of PES schemes. Household characteristics such as education, 
income, labor, skills, and technical capacity are central to implementing PES schemes, as 
demonstrated in the Viet Nam study. Technical capacity of individual farmers was shown to 
be crucial, as households with minimum levels of education were experiencing difficulty 
adapting to a new land-use system. These findings are similar to those of previous studies 
which found family labor availability to be a key factor in the participation of households in 
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land-use modification and technology adoption decisions (Thatcher, Lee, and Schelhas 
1997). While the availability of family labor was positively associated with the adoption of 
PES schemes, education of the household head significantly influenced the decision to 
participate. The larger the land holding was, the greater the chance of its members 
participating in PES schemes. This was due to the fact that small landholders might not be 
able to allocate land for PES schemes without jeopardizing their food security. 
Another finding of this review was that PES schemes can be viable where participants are 
socio-economically better off and landholders are well structured. This is consistent with 
previous arguments that PES schemes are likely to be more functional where land users are 
well organized (Mayrand and Paquin 2004). This is due to the fact that the decision-making 
procedure becomes more complicated and costly with increasing group size since the 
required time and effort appear to be rapidly increasing functions of the size of the group. 
Profitability of adoption or modification of existing land uses emerged as an important 
concern for the poor and smallholders. Acceptability of PES schemes could be low if 
payments were not sufficient to meet costs associated with socially and environmentally 
acceptable land-use practices (Pagiola 2002). This could happen as a result of a mismatch 
between the net value of the current payment and net costs for adopting the new technology 
(e.g., land-use practices) and forgone income from existing land uses. PES schemes must 
be able to meet the opportunity costs of land if sustainability conditions are to be satisfied. 
Adequate socio-economic incentives for local people help shift farmers’ behavior towards 
more environmentally friendly activities, even though this sort of land use provides little 
benefit in the short run. The PRC case study emphasized the role of off-farm activities in 
diverting people from traditional agricultural practices, but that alone might not bring the 
desired outcome unless it is supported by capacity-building measures (e.g., education and 
skills) for participating households. 
The India case study showed the importance of participation of broader sections of society, 
especially the gender dimension, for adopting market-based approaches to watershed 
services. Recognition of the success of women-headed households in implementing 
watershed conservation programs prompted intense consultations with women in Kuhan, 
leading to a timely and much-needed agreement. This was not the case in Suan, where the 
objective of shifting grazing pressure from the catchment resulted in failure due to the 
inability of the management institution to consider needs of stakeholders (e.g., the Bhodi 
micro-catchment). Another imperative was maintaining transparency in the decision-making 
process for the voluntary market for watershed services. Once again, democratically elected 
local leaders were successful in securing confidence among users in Kuhan. 
Scholars have pointed out the significant association between social capital and both 
transaction costs and organizational outcomes (Fussell et al. 2006). Social capital also helps 
overcome factors such as group heterogeneity and controls deviant behaviors. The lack of 
effort towards building institutions at the community level appears to be critical to the 
success of SLCP in the PRC. Compared to other parts of the country, building strong 
farmers’ organizations was considered a luxury in the Ningxia province. The absence of a 
strong community-based organization resulted in weak social networks and lack of 
community capacity to spread risks by pooling community resources in times of natural 
disaster and economic hardship. The Ningxia case study strongly considered social capital 
to be an important ingredient for PES schemes and for making the conservation program 
sustainable. This case highlighted that mobilizing collective community strength, enhancing 
institutional access to information and credit, and addressing inefficiencies of government 
institutions were crucial if a strong case was to be made for farmer adoption of the program. 
Building local institutional capacity for implementing program activities, enhancing their 
competence to influence decision-making policy, and rationalizing local tenure systems were 
central to inducing a change in conservation practices aimed at improving the quality of 
environmental services. 
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Technology adoption may be hindered when returns are risky and insurance or other 
financial markets are imperfect (Giné and Yang in press). Scholars have highlighted income 
and debt as factors influencing household decisions related to adoption of or participation in 
PES schemes (Sureshwaran, Londhe, and Frazier 1996). Because access to credit is very 
limited in the rural areas of developing countries, micro-credit programs could facilitate 
poorer household participation in PES schemes. Support for PES should therefore include 
credit service and technical advice for enhancing efforts for the provisioning of environmental 
services. The Viet Nam case study illustrates a strong correlation between household debt 
and adoption of PES as the probability of adoption was negatively correlated with the 
amount of outstanding household loans. Most land-use modifications in PES require upfront 
investments which could be a barrier for participation. Moreover, it became clear that debt 
burden may force households to harvest plantation forests and this could undermine the 
optimal level of watershed services. Micro-credit facilitates for potential farmers may 
encourage the adoption of PES in such situations. The Australia case also addressed the 
issue of upfront investments for farmer decisions towards land-use modification. 
Collective action towards PES is envisaged as an efficient solution for the provisioning of 
environmental services such as biodiversity conservation and watershed protection. 
Swallow, Meinzen-Dick, and van Noordwijk (2005) supported this proposition because 
community-based approaches help to minimize the costs of transaction. Community-based 
approaches help reduce the costs of transactions, particularly those related to the monitoring 
and certification of PES schemes. This is because of the community’s built-in incentive and 
idiosyncratic knowledge that can be used to make resource-specific decisions. The cases 
from Indonesia, the Philippines, and the PRC reinforce the notion that collective action 
towards PES is central to reducing the costs of transaction. It helps farmers to coordinate 
spatial coverage of PES schemes with larger geographical scope such as biodiversity 
conservation and watershed protection. Collective choice rules crafted by local communities 
retain the potential of reducing the costs of monitoring and certification as these institutions 
amplify individual’s compliance towards management decisions. 
Few local contextual factors appear to be relevant for the uptake, adoption, and operation of 
PES and also their outcomes. In the Maasin watershed, the proximity of the watershed to 
beneficiaries was a real stimulator for the market for watershed services. The watershed is 
very close to the urban area so any changes in the quality of watershed services could be 
immediately realized by the nearby population, particularly quality and quantity of drinking 
water supply. Another contextual factor was the level of community preparedness for 
implementing market mechanisms to environmental services. For example, communities that 
already have good social infrastructure in place (e.g., mature community organizations) 
seemed to be more efficient in implementing PES schemes than communities without them. 
3.4 Information and Communications 
There is significant consensus in the case studies that participation in environmental service 
markets can be realized and enhanced through maximum dissemination of information. 
Through various dialog and consultative processes, households and communities could be 
motivated to participate. The key purpose for consultation with strategic stakeholders would 
be raising awareness on PES as well as facilitating stakeholders’ buy-in to the importance of 
the PES concept. Advocacy, through media mobilization, could also facilitate the awareness-
raising process and highlight the demand for increased information on the subject. It is 
therefore important to galvanize proposed PES schemes with awareness-raising efforts that 
illustrate how PES options contribute to mobilizing local resources, poverty reduction, and 
environmental improvement. In the Maasin watershed, approximately 70 information centers 
provided information on watershed management and also supported environmental 
movements. In the Kanlaon area, efforts directed towards educating people, exchange of 
information, and better communication were crucial for the project. The watershed 
management council of MKNP was a strong player which facilitated the adoption of a 
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watershed management strategy with a strong component of conservation education. In 
Australia, landowners were not aware of the implications of different land management 
practices in reducing recharge to saline aquifers. Although scientific uncertainties associated 
with ground water dynamics, salt sources, and concentrations were overriding concerns, 
even general knowledge about ecosystem services production processes such as changes 
in vegetation cover and salinity outcomes could address impediments to creating market-
based instruments for ecosystem services. 
This review finds that PES design should be influenced by well-informed technical studies. 
Quite often, there is a great degree of uncertainty, as well as a disconnect between 
conservation activities undertaken, and associated ecological outcomes. Willingness to pay 
for environmental services often increases if there is an established link between the 
upstream land-use practices and their corresponding effects on downstream environmental 
outcomes. The Nepal case study shows the importance of a good technical study in order to 
make the downstream beneficiaries confident about the relationship between increased 
conservation activities in the upper watershed and enhanced supply of downstream 
environmental services (i.e., water quality and quantity). The Viet Nam case study also put 
emphasis on carefully designed cost-benefit analysis of watershed degradation to pursue 
both buyers and sellers. The Australia case study further stressed an established link 
between land management practices in upper watersheds and downstream environmental 
outcomes. The India case study underscores the importance of credible scientific information 
to assess problems, find areas of intervention, and build consensus among stakeholders to 
modify land-use changes and design the payment system. 
Well-informed hydrological and economic valuation studies are instrumental for PES 
schemes. An effort to put monetary value on environmental services is not straightforward 
because of the difficulty of measuring public goods and assigning a proper value to them 
(e.g., value of wetlands such as flood control and pollution reduction), but careful choice of 
valuation methods with insights from local use of resources could help design of viable 
markets for environmental services. 
This review suggests a need to engage and build support and partnerships at different levels 
for enabling legal and environmental policy. This is essential to help build constituency for a 
broad-based acceptance and interest in PES, gain legitimacy from both buyers and sellers, 
and support for developing social infrastructures. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
Although market-based instruments for ecosystem services are relatively new mechanisms, 
they have emerged as strong candidates for addressing a number of problems such as 
ecological externalities, incentive incompatibility, information asymmetries, market failure, 
and provisioning of local public goods. During the past decade, a large sum of money has 
been invested in carbon sequestration, watershed protection, and biodiversity conservation 
through voluntary initiatives of the private sector, pilot activities of financing agencies, and 
applied research programs in the developing world (UNDP/London School of Economics and 
Political Science (LSE) 2005). Despite the growing interest and a mounting body of literature 
on PES, there are still glaring gaps in the theory’s predictions and actual situations, 
particularly how different factors affect the PES outcomes. This review paper aimed to fill this 
gap, drawing on available case studies, both regional and international, in order to 
understand the factors that are necessary for adoption and sustainability of markets for 
environmental services. 
This review has come to the realization that designing PES schemes is a complex task and 
that there are no simple prescriptions or blueprints for optimal designs. The difference in the 
success of PES schemes could be understood by examining institutional, socio-economic, 
biophysical, and contextual factors associated with the individual scheme. Perhaps one 
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important message from this review is that PES is likely to be more successful where there 
are secure property rights to land and forest resources as well as enabling policies that 
promote community-based approaches to natural resource management. The argument of 
tenure security consistently emerged in all the case studies. However, this conclusion 
obviously needs to be approached with some caution. Although the adoption of PES 
schemes could be linked to reforming existing property rights, all reforms can create both 
winners and losers. The agents who benefit from such a change will have a larger stake as a 
result of the reform, but new systems of property rights may impose a corresponding 
disincentive effect on others. This is particularly true in cases where communities are 
enjoying greater access to common pool resources, but such traditional rights could be 
threatened due to the formalization of property rights for the sake of establishing markets for 
environmental services. 
Another principle message that emerges from this review is that PES schemes will benefit 
greatly from capacity-building support and availability of information. The aim of capacity 
building is to raise awareness of market-based approaches to environmental services, 
develop legal instruments, and provide training on technical aspects of implementation. 
Access to information was critical and education programs have increased awareness in 
downstream communities about the potential impacts of land-use change in the upper 
watershed. Equity and transparency in decision making in payment schemes are additional 
areas where capacity-building support should be directed. Political economy aspects of the 
program such as getting support from dynamic and innovative leaders at local, regional, and 
national levels, and from politicians, the administration, and civil society (who can act as 
champions for innovative approaches) should be an integral component for designing 
markets for environmental services. 
Credible intermediary institutions can play an important role and, in this review, their support 
was a key ingredient for success. Adoption of PES was higher in cases where there is the 
presence of NGOs and civil society institutions, particularly community-based organizations. 
Moreover, factors such as markets, access to credit, and appropriateness of proposed 
technology appear to be critical. Building trust between buyers and sellers is also important. 
Even where there is initial lack of support, PES initiatives should seek to create a policy 
dialog among different actors. A well-informed dialog may involve multiple components, all 
having a foundation in local engagement and consultation. Greater inclusiveness and 
transparency of the program design helps improve program effectiveness, strengthen links 
between producers and beneficiaries, reduce the enforcement costs, and improve outcomes. 
Further, the gender dimension of PES, such as consultation with women members for 
ensuring their participation in all aspects of PES design, is very crucial. 
Promoting synergy between poverty reduction and environmental conservation goals could 
help achieve equity and sustainability. Further, credible scientific information, particularly the 
hydrological regime within the watershed, became apparent and demonstrated in the case 
studies. For example, market-based instruments could work well where there is an 
established link between land-use practices in the upper watershed and downstream 
provisioning of ecosystem services. Finally, PES schemes should be informed by good 
valuation studies that link payment options with increased environmental service provisions. 
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